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The resurgence of the raccoon: Steps of a Raccoon Stealer v2 Infection (Part 2)
Raccoon Stealer Malware
Since the release of version 2 of Raccoon Stealer in May 2022, Darktrace has observed huge volumes of Raccoon Stealer v2 infections across its client base. The info-stealer, which seeks to obtain and then exfiltrate sensitive data saved on users’ devices, displays a predictable pattern of network activity once it is executed. In this blog post, we will provide details of this pattern of activity, with the goal of helping security teams to recognize network-based signs of Raccoon Stealer v2 infection within their own networks.
What is Raccoon Stealer?
Raccoon Stealer is a classic example of information-stealing malware, which cybercriminals typically use to gain possession of sensitive data saved in users’ browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. In the case of browsers, targeted data typically includes cookies, saved login details, and saved credit card details. In the case of cryptocurrency wallets (henceforth, ‘crypto-wallets’), targeted data typically includes public keys, private keys, and seed phrases [1]. Once sensitive browser and crypto-wallet data is in the hands of cybercriminals, it will likely be used to conduct harmful activities, such as identity theft, cryptocurrency theft, and credit card fraud.
How do you obtain Raccoon Stealer?
Like most info-stealers, Raccoon Stealer is purchasable. The operators of Raccoon Stealer sell Raccoon Stealer samples to their customers (called ‘affiliates’), who then use the info-stealer to gain possession of sensitive data saved on users’ devices. Raccoon Stealer affiliates typically distribute their samples via SEO-promoted websites providing free or cracked software.
Is Raccoon Stealer Still Active?
On the 25th of March 2022, the operators of Raccoon Stealer announced that they would be suspending their operations because one of their core developers had been killed during the Russia-Ukraine conflict [2]. The presence of the hardcoded RC4 key ‘edinayarossiya’ (Russian for ‘United Russia’) within observed Raccoon Stealer v2 samples [3] provides potential evidence of the Raccoon Stealer operators’ allegiances.
Recent details shared by the US Department of Justice [4]/[5] indicate that it was in fact the arrest, rather than the death, of an operator which led the Raccoon Stealer team to suspend their operations [6]. As a result of the FBI, along with law enforcement partners in Italy and the Netherlands, dismantling Raccoon Stealer infrastructure in March 2022 [4], the Raccoon Stealer team was forced to build a new version of the info-stealer.
On the 17th May 2022, the completion of v2 of the info-stealer was announced on the Raccoon Stealer Telegram channel [7]. Since its release in May 2022, Raccoon Stealer v2 has become extremely popular amongst cybercriminals. The prevalence of Raccoon Stealer v2 in the wider landscape has been reflected in Darktrace’s client base, with hundreds of infections being observed within client networks on a monthly basis.
Since Darktrace’s SOC first saw a Raccoon Stealer v2 infection on the 22nd May 2022, the info-stealer has undergone several subtle changes. However, the info-stealer’s general pattern of network activity has remained essentially unchanged.
How Does Raccoon Stealer v2 Infection Work?
A Raccoon Stealer v2 infection typically starts with a user attempting to download cracked or free software from an SEO-promoted website. Attempting to download software from one of these cracked/free software websites redirects the user’s browser (typically via several .xyz or .cfd endpoints) to a page providing download instructions. In May, June, and July, many of the patterns of download behavior observed by Darktrace’s SOC matched the pattern of behavior observed in a cracked software campaign reported by Avast in June [8].
Following the instructions on the download instruction page causes the user’s device to download a password-protected RAR file from a file storage service such as ‘cdn.discordapp[.]com’, ‘mediafire[.]com’, ‘mega[.]nz’, or ‘bitbucket[.]org’. Opening the downloaded file causes the user’s device to execute Raccoon Stealer v2.
Once Raccoon Stealer v2 is running on a device, it will make an HTTP POST request with the target URI ‘/’ and an unusual user-agent string (such as ‘record’, ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’, or ‘TakeMyPainBack’) to a C2 server. This POST request consists of three strings: a machine GUID, a username, and a 128-bit RC4 key [9]. The posted data has the following form:
machineId=X | Y & configId=Z (where X is a machine GUID, Y is a username and Z is a 128-bit RC4 key)
The C2 server responds to the info-stealer’s HTTP POST request with custom-formatted configuration details. These configuration details consist of fields which tell the info-stealer what files to download, what data to steal, and what target URI to use in its subsequent exfiltration POST requests. Below is a list of the fields Darktrace has observed in the configuration details retrieved by Raccoon Stealer v2 samples:
- a ‘libs_mozglue’ field, which specifies a download address for a Firefox library named ‘mozglue.dll’
- a ‘libs_nss3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘nss3.dll’
- a ‘libs_freebl3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘freebl3.dll’
- a ‘libs_softokn3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘softokn3.dll’
- a ‘libs_nssdbm3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘nssdbm3.dll’
- a ‘libs_sqlite3’ field, which specifies a download address for a SQLite command-line program named ‘sqlite3.dll’
- a ‘libs_ msvcp140’ field, which specifies a download address for a Visual C++ runtime library named ‘msvcp140.dll’
- a ‘libs_vcruntime140’ field, which specifies a download address for a Visual C++ runtime library named ‘vcruntime140.dll’
- a ‘ldr_1’ field, which specifies the download address for a follow-up payload for the sample to download
- ‘wlts_X’ fields (where X is the name of a crypto-wallet application), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified crypto-wallet application
- ‘ews_X’ fields (where X is the name of a crypto-wallet browser extension), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified browser extension
- ‘xtntns_X’ fields (where X is the name of a password manager browser extension), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified browser extension
- a ‘tlgrm_Telegram’ field, which specifies data for the sample to obtain from the Telegram Desktop application
- a ‘grbr_Desktop’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Desktop’ folder for the sample to obtain
- a ‘grbr_Documents’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Documents’ folder for the sample to obtain
- a ‘grbr_Recent’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Recent’ folder for the sample to obtain
- a ‘grbr_Downloads’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Downloads’ folder for the sample to obtain
- a ‘sstmnfo_System Info.txt’ field, which specifies whether the sample should gather and exfiltrate a profile of the infected host
- a ‘scrnsht_Screenshot.jpeg’ field, which specifies whether the sample should take and exfiltrate screenshots of the infected host
- a ‘token’ field, which specifies a 32-length string of hexadecimal digits for the sample to use as the target URI of its HTTP POST requests containing stolen data
After retrieving its configuration data, Raccoon Stealer v2 downloads the library files specified in the ‘libs_’ fields. Unusual user-agent strings (such as ‘record’, ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’, and ‘TakeMyPainBack’) are used in the HTTP GET requests for these library files. In all Raccoon Stealer v2 infections seen by Darktrace, the paths of the URLs specified in the ‘libs_’ fields have the following form:
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/X (where X is the name of the targeted DLL file)
Raccoon Stealer v2 uses the DLLs which it downloads to gain access to sensitive data (such as cookies, credit card details, and login details) saved in browsers running on the infected host.
Depending on the data provided in the configuration details, Raccoon Stealer v2 will typically seek to obtain, in addition to sensitive data saved in browsers, the following information:
- Information about the Operating System and applications installed on the infected host
- Data from specified crypto-wallet software
- Data from specified crypto-wallet browser extensions
- Data from specified local folders
- Data from Telegram Desktop
- Data from specified password manager browser extensions
- Screenshots of the infected host
Raccoon Stealer v2 exfiltrates the data which it obtains to its C2 server by making HTTP POST requests with unusual user-agent strings (such as ‘record’, ‘rc2.0/client’, ‘rqwrwqrqwrqw’, and ‘TakeMyPainBack’) and target URIs matching the 32-length string of hexadecimal digits specified in the ‘token’ field of the configuration details. The stolen data exfiltrated by Raccoon Stealer typically includes files named ‘System Info.txt’, ‘---Screenshot.jpeg’, ‘\cookies.txt’, and ‘\passwords.txt’.
If a ‘ldr_1’ field is present in the retrieved configuration details, then Raccoon Stealer will complete its operation by downloading the binary file specified in the ‘ldr_1’ field. In all observed cases, the paths of the URLs specified in the ‘ldr_1’ field end in a sequence of digits, followed by ‘.bin’. The follow-up payload seems to vary between infections, likely due to this additional-payload feature being customizable by Raccoon Stealer affiliates. In many cases, the info-stealer, CryptBot, was delivered as the follow-up payload.
Darktrace Coverage of Raccoon Stealer
Once a user’s device becomes infected with Raccoon Stealer v2, it will immediately start to communicate over HTTP with a C2 server. The HTTP requests made by the info-stealer have an empty Host header (although Host headers were used by early v2 samples) and highly unusual User Agent headers. When Raccoon Stealer v2 was first observed in May 2022, the user-agent string ‘record’ was used in its HTTP requests. Since then, it appears that the operators of Raccoon Stealer have made several changes to the user-agent strings used by the info-stealer, likely in an attempt to evade signature-based detections. Below is a timeline of the changes to the info-stealer’s user-agent strings, as observed by Darktrace’s SOC:
- 22nd May 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘record’
- 2nd July 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
- 29th July 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘rc2.0/client’
- 10th August 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent strings ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’ and ‘rqwrwqrqwrqw’
- 16th Sep 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘TakeMyPainBack’
The presence of these highly unusual user-agent strings within infected devices’ HTTP requests causes the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach:
- Device / New User Agent
- Device / New User Agent and New IP
- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
- Device / Three or More New User Agents
These DETECT models look for devices making HTTP requests with unusual user-agent strings, rather than specific user-agent strings which are known to be malicious. This method of detection enables the models to continually identify Raccoon Stealer v2 HTTP traffic, despite the changes made to the info-stealer’s user-agent strings.
After retrieving configuration details from a C2 server, Raccoon Stealer v2 samples make HTTP GET requests for several DLL libraries. Since these GET requests are directed towards highly unusual IP addresses, the downloads of the DLLs cause the following DETECT models to breach:
- Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
- Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
- Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
Raccoon Stealer v2 samples send data to their C2 server via HTTP POST requests with an absent Host header. Since these POST requests lack a Host header and have a highly unusual destination IP, their occurrence causes the following DETECT model to breach:
- Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
Certain Raccoon Stealer v2 samples download (over HTTP) a follow-up payload once they have exfiltrated data. Since the target URIs of the HTTP GET requests made by v2 samples end in a sequence of digits followed by ‘.bin’, the samples’ downloads of follow-up payloads cause the following DETECT model to breach:
- Anomalous File / Numeric File Download
If Darktrace RESPOND/Network is configured within a customer’s environment, then Raccoon Stealer v2 activity should cause the following inhibitive actions to be autonomously taken on infected systems:
- Enforce pattern of life — This action results in a device only being able to make connections which are normal for it to make
- Enforce group pattern of life — This action results in a device only being able to make connections which are normal for it or any of its peers to make
- Block matching connections — This action results in a device being unable to make connections to particular IP/Port pairs
- Block all outgoing traffic — This action results in a device being unable to make any connections
Given that Raccoon Stealer v2 infections move extremely fast, with the time between initial infection and data exfiltration sometimes less than a minute, the availability of Autonomous Response technology such as Darktrace RESPOND is vital for the containment of Raccoon Stealer v2 infections.
Conclusion
Since the release of Raccoon Stealer v2 back in 2022, the info-stealer has relentlessly infected the devices of unsuspecting users. Once the info-stealer infects a user’s device, it retrieves and then exfiltrates sensitive information within a matter of minutes. The distinctive pattern of network behavior displayed by Raccoon Stealer v2 makes the info-stealer easy to spot. However, the changes which the Raccoon Stealer operators make to the User Agent headers of the info-stealer’s HTTP requests make anomaly-based methods key for the detection of the info-stealer’s HTTP traffic. The operators of Raccoon Stealer can easily change the superficial features of their malware’s C2 traffic, however, they cannot easily change the fact that their malware causes highly unusual network behavior. Spotting this behavior, and then autonomously responding to it, is likely the best bet which organizations have at stopping a Raccoon once it gets inside their networks.
Thanks to the Threat Research Team for its contributions to this blog.
References
[2] https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1507312171914461188
[3] https://www.esentire.com/blog/esentire-threat-intelligence-malware-analysis-raccoon-stealer-v2-0
[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsz6acw-ZJ
[6] https://riskybiznews.substack.com/p/raccoon-stealer-dev-didnt-die-in
[7] https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d
[8] https://blog.avast.com/fakecrack-campaign
[9] https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-2-in-depth-analysis/
Appendices
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Resource Development
• T1588.001 — Obtain Capabilities: Malware
• T1608.001 — Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
• T1608.005 — Stage Capabilities: Link Target
• T1608.006 — Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
Execution
• T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File
Credential Access
• T1555.003 — Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
• T1555.005 — Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers
• T1552.001 — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Command and Control
• T1071.001 — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
• T1105 — Ingress Tool Transfer
IOCS
Tipo
IOC
Description
User-Agent String
record
String used in User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests
User-Agent String
mozzzzzzzzzzz
String used inUser Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests
User-Agent String
rc2.0/client
String used in User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests
User-Agent String
qwrqrwrqwrqwr
String used in User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests
User-Agent String
rqwrwqrqwrqw
String used in User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests
User-Agent String
TakeMyPainBack
String used in User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests
Domain Name
brain-lover[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
polar-gift[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
cool-story[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
fall2sleep[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
broke-bridge[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
use-freedom[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
just-trust[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
soft-viper[.]site
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
tech-lover[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
heal-brain[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
Domain Name
love-light[.]xyz
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
104.21.80[.]14
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
107.152.46[.]84
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
135.181.147[.]255
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
135.181.168[.]157
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
138.197.179[.]146
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
141.98.169[.]33
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.170[.]100
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.170[.]175
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.170[.]98
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.173[.]33
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.173[.]72
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.247[.]175
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.19.247[.]177
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
146.70.125[.]95
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
152.89.196[.]234
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
165.225.120[.]25
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
168.100.10[.]238
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
168.100.11[.]23
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
168.100.9[.]234
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
170.75.168[.]118
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
172.67.173[.]14
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
172.86.75[.]189
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
172.86.75[.]33
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
174.138.15[.]216
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
176.124.216[.]15
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.106.92[.]14
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.173.34[.]161
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.173.34[.]161
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.225.17[.]198
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.225.19[.]190
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.225.19[.]229
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.53.46[.]103
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.53.46[.]76
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
185.53.46[.]77
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
188.119.112[.]230
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
190.117.75[.]91
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.106.191[.]182
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.149.129[.]135
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.149.129[.]144
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.149.180[.]210
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.149.185[.]192
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.233.193[.]50
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]138
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]17
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]192
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]213
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]214
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]215
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]26
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.43.146[.]45
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
193.56.146[.]177
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
194.180.174[.]180
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
195.201.148[.]250
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
206.166.251[.]156
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
206.188.196[.]200
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
206.53.53[.]18
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
207.154.195[.]173
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
213.252.244[.]2
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
38.135.122[.]210
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.10.20[.]248
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.11.19[.]99
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.133.216[.]110
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.133.216[.]145
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.133.216[.]148
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.133.216[.]249
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.133.216[.]71
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.140.146[.]169
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.140.147[.]245
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.142.212[.]100
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.142.213[.]24
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.142.215[.]91
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.142.215[.]91
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.142.215[.]92
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.144.29[.]18
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.144.29[.]243
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.15.156[.]11
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.15.156[.]2
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.15.156[.]31
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.15.156[.]31
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.150.67[.]156
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.153.230[.]183
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.153.230[.]228
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.159.251[.]163
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.159.251[.]164
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.61.136[.]67
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.61.138[.]162
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.67.228[.]8
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.67.231[.]202
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.67.34[.]152
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.67.34[.]234
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.144[.]187
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.144[.]54
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.144[.]55
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.145[.]174
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.145[.]83
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.147[.]39
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.8.147[.]79
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.84.0.152
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.86.86[.]78
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.54[.]110
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.54[.]110
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.54[.]95
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.55[.]115
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.55[.]117
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.55[.]193
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.55[.]198
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.55[.]20
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.89.55[.]84
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
45.92.156[.]150
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.36[.]154
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.36[.]230
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.36[.]231
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.36[.]232
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.36[.]233
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.39[.]34
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.39[.]74
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.39[.]75
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.182.39[.]77
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.118[.]33
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.176[.]62
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.177[.]217
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.177[.]234
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.177[.]43
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.177[.]47
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.177[.]92
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.177[.]98
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.22[.]142
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.23[.]100
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.23[.]25
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
5.252.23[.]76
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
51.195.166[.]175
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
51.195.166[.]176
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
51.195.166[.]194
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
51.81.143[.]169
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
62.113.255[.]110
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
65.109.3[.]107
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
74.119.192[.]56
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
74.119.192[.]73
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.232.39[.]101
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.73.133[.]0
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.73.133[.]4
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.73.134[.]45
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.75.230[.]25
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.75.230[.]39
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.75.230[.]70
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.75.230[.]93
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.100[.]101
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.102[.]12
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.102[.]230
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.102[.]44
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.102[.]57
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.102[.]84
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.103[.]31
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.73[.]154
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.73[.]213
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.73[.]32
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
77.91.74[.]67
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
78.159.103[.]195
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
78.159.103[.]196
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
80.66.87[.]23
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
80.66.87[.]28
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
80.71.157[.]112
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
80.71.157[.]138
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
80.92.204[.]202
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
87.121.52[.]10
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
88.119.175[.]187
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
89.185.85[.]53
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
89.208.107[.]42
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
89.39.106[.]78
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
91.234.254[.]126
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.104[.]16
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.104[.]17
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.104[.]18
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.106[.]116
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.106[.]224
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.107[.]132
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.107[.]138
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.96[.]109
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.97[.]129
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.97[.]53
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.97[.]56
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.97[.]57
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.131.98[.]5
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.244[.]114
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.244[.]119
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.244[.]21
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.247[.]24
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.247[.]26
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.247[.]30
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
94.158.247[.]44
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
95.216.109[.]16
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
IP Address
95.217.124[.]179
Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/mozglue.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/freebl3.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/softokn3.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nssdbm3.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/sqlite3.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/msvcp140.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/vcruntime140.dll
URI used in download of library file
URI
/C9S2G1K6I3G8T3X7/56296373798691245143.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/O6K3E4G6N9S8S1/91787438215733789009.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/Z2J8J3N2S2Z6X2V3S0B5/45637662345462341.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/rgd4rgrtrje62iuty/19658963328526236.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/sd325dt25ddgd523/81852849956384.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/B0L1N2H4R1N5I5S6/40055385413647326168.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/F5Q8W3O3O8I2A4A4B8S8/31427748106757922101.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/36141266339446703039.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/wH0nP0qH9eJ6aA9zH1mN/1.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/K2X2R1K4C6Z3G8L0R1H0/68515718711529966786.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/C3J7N6F6X3P8I0I0M/17819203282122080878.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/W9H1B8P3F2J2H2K7U1Y7G5N4C0Z4B/18027641.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/P2T9T1Q6P7Y5J3D2T0N0O8V/73239348388512240560937.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/W5H6O5P0E4Y6P8O1B9D9G0P9Y9G4/671837571800893555497.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/U8P2N0T5R0F7G2J0/898040207002934180145349.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/AXEXNKPSBCKSLMPNOMNRLUEPR/3145102300913020.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/wK6nO2iM9lE7pN7e/7788926473349244.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
URI
/U4N9B5X5F5K2A0L4L4T5/84897964387342609301.bin
URI used in download of follow-up payload
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Dentro del SOC
PurpleFox in a Henhouse: How Darktrace Hunted Down a Persistent and Dynamic Rootkit
Versatile Malware: PurpleFox
As organizations and security teams across the world move to bolster their digital defenses against cyber threats, threats actors, in turn, are forced to adopt more sophisticated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to circumvent them. Rather than being static and predictable, malware strains are becoming increasingly versatile and therefore elusive to traditional security tools.
One such example is PurpleFox. First observed in 2018, PurpleFox is a combined fileless rootkit and backdoor trojan known to target Windows machines. PurpleFox is known for consistently adapting its functionalities over time, utilizing different infection vectors including known vulnerabilities (CVEs), fake Telegram installers, and phishing. It is also leveraged by other campaigns to deliver ransomware tools, spyware, and cryptocurrency mining malware. It is also widely known for using Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) files masquerading as other file types.
The Evolution of PurpleFox
The Original Strain
First reported in March 2018, PurpleFox was identified to be a trojan that drops itself onto Windows machines using an MSI installation package that alters registry values to replace a legitimate Windows system file [1]. The initial stage of infection relied on the third-party toolkit RIG Exploit Kit (EK). RIG EK is hosted on compromised or malicious websites and is dropped onto the unsuspecting system when they visit browse that site. The built-in Windows installer (MSIEXEC) is leveraged to run the installation package retrieved from the website. This, in turn, drops two files into the Windows directory – namely a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) that acts as a loader, and the payload of the malware. After infection, PurpleFox is often used to retrieve and deploy other types of malware.
Subsequent Variants
Since its initial discovery, PurpleFox has also been observed leveraging PowerShell to enable fileless infection and additional privilege escalation vulnerabilities to increase the likelihood of successful infection [2]. The PowerShell script had also been reported to be masquerading as a .jpg image file. PowerSploit modules are utilized to gain elevated privileges if the current user lacks administrator privileges. Once obtained, the script proceeds to retrieve and execute a malicious MSI package, also masquerading as an image file. As of 2020, PurpleFox no longer relied on the RIG EK for its delivery phase, instead spreading via the exploitation of the SMB protocol [3]. The malware would leverage the compromised systems as hosts for the PurpleFox payloads to facilitate its spread to other systems. This mode of infection can occur without any user action, akin to a worm.
The current iteration of PurpleFox reportedly uses brute-forcing of vulnerable services, such as SMB, to facilitate its spread over the network and escalate privileges. By scanning internet-facing Windows computers, PurpleFox exploits weak passwords for Windows user accounts through SMB, including administrative credentials to facilitate further privilege escalation.
Darktrace detection of PurpleFox
In July 2023, Darktrace observed an example of a PurpleFox infection on the network of a customer in the healthcare sector. This observation was a slightly different method of downloading the PurpleFox payload. An affected device was observed initiating a series of service control requests using DCE-RPC, instructing the device to make connections to a host of servers to download a malicious .PNG file, later confirmed to be the PurpleFox rootkit. The device was then observed carrying out worm-like activity to other external internet-facing servers, as well as scanning related subnets.
Darktrace DETECT™ was able to successfully identify and track this compromise across the cyber kill chain and ensure the customer was able to take swift remedial action to prevent the attack from escalating further.
While the customer in question did have Darktrace RESPOND™, it was configured in human confirmation mode, meaning any mitigative actions had to be manually applied by the customer’s security team. If RESPOND had been enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to take swift action against the compromise to contain it at the earliest instance.
Attack Overview
Initial Scanning over SMB
On July 14, 2023, Darktrace detected the affected device scanning other internal devices on the customer’s network via port 445. The numerous connections were consistent with the aforementioned worm-like activity that has been reported from PurpleFox behavior as it appears to be targeting SMB services looking for open or vulnerable channels to exploit.
This initial scanning activity was detected by Darktrace DETECT, specifically through the model breach ‘Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity’. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ then launched an autonomous investigation into these internal connections and tied them into one larger-scale network reconnaissance incident, rather than a series of isolated connections.
As Darktrace RESPOND was configured in human confirmation mode, it was unable to autonomously block these internal connections. However, it did suggest blocking connections on port 445, which could have been manually applied by the customer’s security team.
Privilege Escalation
The device successfully logged in via NTLM with the credential, ‘administrator’. Darktrace recognized that the endpoint was external to the customer’s environment, indicating that the affected device was now being used to propagate the malware to other networks. Considering the lack of observed brute-force activity up to this point, the credentials for ‘administrator’ had likely been compromised prior to Darktrace’s deployment on the network, or outside of Darktrace’s purview via a phishing attack.
Exploitation
Darktrace then detected a series of service control requests over DCE-RPC using the credential ‘admin’ to make SVCCTL Create Service W Requests. A script was then observed where the controlled device is instructed to launch mshta.exe, a Windows-native binary designed to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files. This enables the execution of arbitrary script code, VBScript in this case.
There are a few MSIEXEC flags to note:
- /i : installs or configures a product
- /Q : sets the user interface level. In this case, it is set to ‘No UI’, which is used for “quiet” execution, so no user interaction is required
Evidently, this was an attempt to evade detection by endpoint users as it is surreptitiously installed onto the system. This corresponds to the download of the rootkit that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. At this stage, the infected device continues to be leveraged as an attack device and scans SMB services over external endpoints. The device also appeared to attempt brute-forcing over NTLM using the same ‘administrator’ credential to these endpoints. This activity was identified by Darktrace DETECT which, if enabled in autonomous response mode would have instantly blocked similar outbound connections, thus preventing the spread of PurpleFox.
Installation
On August 9, Darktrace observed the device making initial attempts to download a malicious .PNG file. This was a notable change in tactics from previously reported PurpleFox campaigns which had been observed utilizing .MOE files for their payloads [3]. The .MOE payloads are binary files that are more easily detected and blocked by traditional signatured-based security measures as they are not associated with known software. The ubiquity of .PNG files, especially on the web, make identifying and blacklisting the files significantly more difficult.
The first connection was made with the URI ‘/test.png’. It was noted that the HTTP method here was HEAD, a method similar to GET requests except the server must not return a message-body in the response.
The metainformation contained in the HTTP headers in response to a HEAD request should be identical to the information sent in response to a GET request. This method is often used to test hypertext links for validity and recent modification. This is likely a way of checking if the server hosting the payload is still active. Avoiding connections that could possibly be detected by antivirus solutions can help keep this activity under-the-radar.
The server responds with a status code of 200 before the download begins. The HEAD request could be part of the attacker’s verification that the server is still running, and that the payload is available for download. The ‘/test.png’ HEAD request was sent twice, likely for double confirmation to begin the file transfer.
Subsequent analysis using a Packet Capture (PCAP) tool revealed that this connection used the Windows Installer user agent that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. The device then began to download a payload that was masquerading as a Microsoft Word document. The device was thus able to download the payload twice, from two separate endpoints.
By masquerading as a Microsoft Word file, the threat actor was likely attempting to evade the detection of the endpoint user and traditional security tools by passing off as an innocuous text document. Likewise, using a Windows Installer user agent would enable threat actors to bypass antivirus measures and disguise the malicious installation as legitimate download activity.
Darktrace DETECT identified that these were masqueraded file downloads by correctly identifying the mismatch between the file extension and the true file type. Subsequently, AI Analyst was able to correctly identify the file type and deduced that this download was indicative of the device having been compromised.
In this case, the device attempted to download the payload from several different endpoints, many of which had low antivirus detection rates or open-source intelligence (OSINT) flags, highlighting the need to move beyond traditional signature-base detections.
If Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack it would have acted by blocking connections to these suspicious endpoints, thus preventing the download of malicious files. However, as RESPOND was in human confirmation mode, RESPOND actions required manual application by the customer’s security team which unfortunately did not happen, as such the device was able to download the payloads.
Conclusion
The PurpleFox malware is a particularly dynamic strain known to continually evolve over time, utilizing a blend of old and new approaches to achieve its goals which is likely to muddy expectations on its behavior. By frequently employing new methods of attack, malicious actors are able to bypass traditional security tools that rely on signature-based detections and static lists of indictors of compromise (IoCs), necessitating a more sophisticated approach to threat detection.
Darktrace DETECT’s Self-Learning AI enables it to confront adaptable and elusive threats like PurpleFox. By learning and understanding customer networks, it is able to discern normal network behavior and patterns of life, distinguishing expected activity from potential deviations. This anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows Darktrace to detect cyber threats as soon as they emerge.
By combining DETECT with the autonomous response capabilities of RESPOND, Darktrace customers are able to effectively safeguard their digital environments and ensure that emerging threats can be identified and shut down at the earliest stage of the kill chain, regardless of the tactics employed by would-be attackers.
Credit to Piramol Krishnan, Cyber Analyst, Qing Hong Kwa, Senior Cyber Analyst & Deputy Team Lead, Singapore
Appendices
Darktrace Model Detections
- Device / Increased External Connectivity
- Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
- Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)
- Compliance / External Windows Communications
- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
- Compromise / Unusual SVCCTL Activity
- Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP
- Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
RESPOND Models
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
List of IoCs
IoC - Type - Description
/C558B828.Png - URI - URI for Purple Fox Rootkit [4]
5b1de649f2bc4eb08f1d83f7ea052de5b8fe141f - File Hash - SHA1 hash of C558B828.Png file (Malware payload)
190.4.210[.]242 - IP - Purple Fox C2 Servers
218.4.170[.]236 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
180.169.1[.]220 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
103.94.108[.]114:10837 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
221.199.171[.]174:16543 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
61.222.155[.]49:14098 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
178.128.103[.]246:17880 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
222.134.99[.]132:12539 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
164.90.152[.]252:18075 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
198.199.80[.]121:11490 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Tactic - Technique
Reconnaissance - Active Scanning T1595, Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks T1595.001, Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002
Resource Development - Obtain Capabilities: Malware T1588.001
Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001
Initial Access - Drive-by Compromise T1189
Defense Evasion - Masquerading T1036
Credential Access - Brute Force T1110
Discovery - Network Service Discovery T1046
Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002
References
- https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/purple-fox-trojan-burst-out-globally-and-infected-more-than-30000-users/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html
- https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/purple-fox-rootkit-now-propagates-as-a-worm
- https://www.foregenix.com/blog/an-overview-on-purple-fox
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_sg/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html
Blog
OT
$70 Million in Cyber Security Funding for Electric Cooperatives & Utilities
What is the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal?
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law passed by congress in 2021 aimed to upgrade power and infrastructure to deliver clean, reliable energy across the US to achieve zero-emissions. To date, the largest investment in clean energy, the deal will fund new programs to support the development and deployment of clean energy technology.
Why is it relevant to electric municipalities?
Section 40124 of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law allocates $250 million over a 5-year period to create the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity (RMUC) Program to help electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats.1 This act illuminates the value behind a full life-cycle approach to cyber security. Thus, finding a cyber security solution that can provide all aspects of security in one integrated platform would enhance the overall security posture and ease many of the challenges that arise with adopting multiple point solutions.
On November 16, 2023 the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) released the Advanced Cybersecurity Technology (ACT) for electric utilities offering a $70 million funding opportunity that aims to enhance the cybersecurity posture of electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities.
Funding Details
10 projects will be funded with application submissions due November 29, 2023, 5:00 pm ET with $200,000 each in cash prizes in the following areas:
- Direct support for eligible utilities to make investments in cybersecurity technologies, tools, training, and improvements in utility processes and procedures;
- Funding to strengthen the peer-to-peer and not-for-profit cybersecurity technical assistance ecosystem currently serving eligible electric utilities; and
- Increasing access to cybersecurity technical assistance and training for eligible utilities with limited cybersecurity resources. 2
To submit for this award visit: https://www.herox.com/ACT1Prize
How can electric municipalities utilize the funding?
While the adoption of hybrid working patterns increase cloud and SaaS usage, the number of industrial IoT devices also continues to rise. The result is decrease in visibility for security teams and new entry points for attackers. Particularly for energy and utility organizations.
Electric cooperatives seeking to enhance their cyber security posture can aim to invest in cyber security tools that provide the following:
Compliance support: Consider finding an OT security solution that maps out how its solutions and features help your organization comply with relevant compliance mandates such as NIST, ISA, FERC, TSA, HIPAA, CIS Controls, and more.
Anomaly based detection: Siloed security solutions also fail to detect attacks that span
the entire organization. Anomaly-based detection enhances an organization’s cyber security posture by proactively defending against potential attacks and maintaining a comprehensive view of their attack surface.
Integration capabilities: Implementation of several point solutions that complete individual tasks runs the risk of increasing workloads for operators and creates additional challenges with compliance, budgeting, and technical support. Look for cyber security tools that integrate with your existing technologies.
Passive and active asset tracking: Active Identification offers accurate enumeration, real time updates, vulnerability assessment, asset validation while Passive Identification eliminates the risk of operational disruption, minimizes risk, does not generate additional network traffic. It would be ideal to find a security solution that can do both.
Can secure both IT and OT in unison: Given that most OT cyber-attacks actually start in IT networks before pivoting into OT, a mature security posture for critical infrastructure would include a single solution for both IT and OT. Separate solutions for IT and OT present challenges when defending network boundaries and detecting incidents when an attacker pivots from IT to OT. These independent solutions also significantly increase operator workload and materially diminish risk mitigation efforts.
Darktrace/OT for Electric Cooperatives and Utilities
For smaller teams with just one or two dedicated employees, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst and Investigation features allow end users to spend less time in the platform as it compiles critical incidents into comprehensive actionable event reports. AI Analyst brings all the information into a centralized view with incident reporting in natural language summaries and can be generated for compliance reports specific to regulatory requirements.
For larger teams, Darktrace alerts can be forwarded to 3rd party platforms such as a SIEM, where security team decision making is augmented. Additionally, executive reports and autonomous response reduce the alert fatigue generally associated with legacy tools. Most importantly, Darktrace’s unique understanding of normal allows security teams to detect zero-days and signatureless attacks regardless of the size of the organization and how alerts are consumed.
Key Benefits of Darktrace/OT
- Anomaly-based detection and real-time response
- Secures IT, OT, and IoT in unison
- Active and Passive Asset Identification
- Automated security reporting
- Attack surface management and vulnerability assessment
- Covers all levels of the Purdue Model
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References
